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HELPLESS GIANTS: THE NATIONAL PARKS
AND THE REGULATION OF
PRIVATE LANDS
Joseph L. Sax*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The national parks are among the few unambiguous triumphs of
American public policy. Carved out of a vast public domain that
was being cruelly exploited and recklessly given away, the parks
stand as a rare monument of national concern for posterity. Yet the
decision to establish the parks as distinctive public lands has itself
produced difficulties, for, although the parks alone were set aside to
be conserved "unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations," 1
the parks do not stand alone. Ori their borders, and sometimes in
their midst, are private landholdings, which are subject to no such
protective mandate.
While activities on neighboring lands have always created some
problems for park managers, as even the earliest reports from
Yellowstone reveal, 2 the adverse impact of these activities on the
parks has become a major issue only in recent years. The early parks
were enclaves within a huge and largely unused public domain;
they were protected by their own isolation. Often they were surrounded by national forest land that had itself been set aside
for protection by the Forest Service in its halcyon days. Today,
however, most new units of the parks system3 are created in close
proximity to major population centers. They are frequently the last
fragments of unspoiled scenery that remain easily accessible to
millions of urban residents. 4 Even in the West, intensive develop* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, Harvard; J.D. 1959,
University of Chicago.-Ed.
1. Act of Aug. 25, 1916, 39 Stat. 535, ch. 408, § 1 (1916) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1-460 (1970), as amended by Supp. V 1975).
2. See H. HAMPTON, How THE U.S. CAVALRY SAVED OUR NATIONAL PARKS 92
(1971). See also J. IsE, OuR NATIONAL PARK POLICY 483 (1961); H. JAMES, RoMANCE OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 48 (1939).
3. Since the parks range from wilderness to rather intense urban uses, management goals differ significantly within the system. See U.S. Dept. of the Interior,
National Park Service, Management Policies, Introduction (1975) (mimeo) [hereinafter Management Policies Report]. This article will treat the entire system as a
unity since the legal problems of regulating private lands are identical.
4. E.g., eastern national seashores such as Cape Cod [Act of Aug. 7, 1961, Pub.
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ment and private ownership sometimes exist at the very edges of
the parks. 5 Moreover, a number of park units, particularly at some
of the newer National Seashores, contain substantial private
landholdings within the park boundaries. 0
This new set of circumstances has spawned a variety of problems.
At Redwoods National Park in California, private timber companies
own land on the watershed of Redwood Creek, immediately adjacent
to the park; their lumbering activities have caused erosion, stream
siltation, and blow-down of park timber, in addition to the unsightly
visual effects of large-scale clearcutting. 7 Several years ago, a
private entrepreneur's plan to build a large tower on private land
immediately overlooking the battlefield site at Gettysburg National
Military Park led first to a bitter controversy and ultimately to litigation initiated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 8 More
recently, Park Service officials have expressed concern over a proposal by Marriott Corporation to build a so-called theme park next
to Manassas National Battlefield Park. 0 At Fire Island National Seashore, where there are substantial private landholdings, intensive
homesite development has proceeded with the approval of local
zoning authorities; 10 bitter litigation has followed restrictions on veL. No. 87-126, 75 Stat. 284 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 459b (1970) )]; Fire Island
[Act of Sept. 11, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-587, 78 Stat. 928 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 459e ( 1970) )]; Assateague Island [Act of Sept. 21, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-165,
79 Stat. 824 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 459f (1970) )]. Some units are in the midst
of major urban centers. E.g., Cuyahoga Valley National Recreation Area [Act of
Dec. 27, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-555, 88 Stat. 1784 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460ff
(Supp. V 1975) )]; Gateway National Recreation Area [Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-592, 86 Stat. 1308 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460cc (Supp. V 1975) )];
Golden Gate National Recreation Area [Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-589,
86 Stat. 1299 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460bb (Supp. V 1975) )].
5. E.g., Redwoods National Park [Act of Oct. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-545, 82
Stat. 931 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 79c(3)(e) (1970))]. See Sierra Club v. Morton,
400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.
Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
6. See note 4 supra; notes 10, 126, 139, 141 infra.
7. See authorities cited note 5 supra.
8. Pennsylvania v. Morton, 381 F. Supp. 293 (D.D.C. 1974); Commonwealth
v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
9. General and Oversight Briefing Relating to Developments Near Manassas National Battlefield, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Parks and Recreation
of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93,
pt. 9, at 47 (1973). Proposals have been made to locate theme parks on the edges
of other parks as well, such as Great Smoky Mountains National Park in Tennessee.
Interview with Boyd Evison, Superintendent, Great Smoky Mountains National Park,
in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Nov. 16, 1976).
10. Hearings on S. 867 and Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on National Parks
and Recreation of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 94, pt. 11, at 17 (1975).
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hicle use by private landowners. 11 Owners of undeveloped lands near
Cape Hatteras National Seashore have demanded utility rights-of-way
across federal lands, in order to promote the proliferation of summer
homes. 12 A major airport was planned on the drainage above Everglades National Park. 13 A nuclear power plant has been proposed
for a site immediately adjacent to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore.14 The list could easily be extended.
While intrusive private activities have increased all around them,
park managers have stood by nervously, sensing that they were
caring for helpless giants. The Park Service is aware that Congress
has given it very little explicit authority to regulate private lands, 15
but underlying Park Service hesitancy to act is a more profound concern about the constitutional power of the federal government to
control private land uses near and within the parks. These constitutional doubts, though largely misconceived, arise out of a complex
set of issues that need to be clarified. This article first describes current administrative practice and existing legislation pertaining to the regulation of private lands. Next, it reviews the events
that have convinced the Park Service that its regulatory authority is
severely restricted. There follows an examination of the constitutional questions that increased federal control of private lands
would raise. The article concludes by suggesting a method for
dealing with the various intrusive private uses that now plague the
Park Service.

IL

CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION OF PRIVATE LANDS

There has been very little regulation of private landowners within
the parks or on their peripheries. Only a handful of statutes direct
11. See authorities cited note 139 infra.
12. 49 NATL. PARKS & CONSERVATION 26 (Nov. 1975); 50 id. 4 (May 1976).
13. L. CARTER, THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE, LAND AND WATER POLICY IN A
GROWTH STATE 187-227 (1974).
14. Izaak Walton League--0f America v. AEC, 515 F.2d 513 (7th Cir.), revd.
and remanded, 423 U.S. 12 (1975); on remand, 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3341 (1976).
This article does not consider relations between the Park Service and other federal
agencies. See, however, The National Forest Ski Area Bill, S. 2125, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), as amended, S. 2125, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(a)(3)(D) (1976),
requiring that the regulated activity have no adverse impact on nearby national parks.
See also note 30 infra.
15. Federal regulation of private activity on federally owned lands within the
parks is well recognized. See United States v. Carter, 339 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Ariz.
1972), and cases cited therein. See notes 65, 86 infra.
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the Secretary of the Interior to control private users within the parks;
none of these anticipate or provide for the general exercise of land
use controls. For example, the Secretary is instructed to regulate
holders of grazing permits at Kings Canyon National Park, 16 to devise rules controlling fishing by long-standing residents at Cape
Hatteras, 17 and to establish a scheme of regulation for hotel and
restaurant keepers at Crater Lake. 18 Obviously, the regulation prescribed by such statutes is both sporadic and limited.
In the one instance where Congress has anticipated the need for
broad federal land use controls, it has sought to achieve these controls indirectly. A series of statutes, principally involving national
seashore areas, contain so-called sword-of-Damocles provisions. 10
Briefly stated, these laws suspend the Secretary's authority to acquire
private inholdings by eminent domain if the local governments impose zoning requirements consistent with standards promulgated by
the Secretary, and if the landowners comply with them. The provisions do not make the federal standards binding on the landowners,
or directly enforceable by the Park Service; they have instead been
judicially interpreted to give the Secretary the right to condemn as
the sole penalty for noncompliance. 20 While the idea is an imaginative one, it has often been ineffective because of a chronic shortage of condemnation funds. 21 Moreover, because the landowners
usually obtain a zoning variance from the local government before
commencing uses inconsistent with federal standards, they are not
16. 16 u.s.c. § 80 (1970).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 459a-1 (1970).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 123 (1970). Concessions in the parks are subject to "carefully
controlled safeguards against unregulated and indiscriminate use." 16 U,S.C. § 20
(1970). Regulations as to particular parks are collected at 36 C.F.R. §§ 20-31
(19'76).
19. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 459b-3(b)(2) (1970) (Cape Cod); 16 U.S.C. 459e1(e) (1970) (Fire Island). See also 16 U.S.C. § 410j (1970) (Everglades National
Park); Eastern Wilderness Act, Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-622, § 6(b),
88 Stat. 2100-01. These provisions are an extension of an arrangement whereby
existing residents are allowed to retain lifetime occupancy rights so long as their
uses are consistent with the Secretary's restrictions. See 16 U.S.C. § 459f-1 (d)
(1970) (Assateague Island); 16 U.S.C. §§ 459g-l(c), (d) (1970) (Cape Lookout);
C. CAMPBELL, BIRTH OF A NATIONAL PARK IN THE GREAT SMOKY MOUNTAINS 70,
99 (1960).
The sword-of-Damocles Jaws have been upheld in Halpert v. Udall, 231 F. Supp.
574 (S.D. Fla. 1964), affd., 379 U.S. 645 (1965).
20. See Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1143-44, 1148 (2d Cir. 1974).
21. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, GENERAL MAN•
AGEMENT PLAN, FIRE ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHORE 105 (Draft, June, 1976). For the
procedure for obtaining condemnation approval, see H.R. Rep. No. 1395, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 16 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1275, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1968); S. Rep.
No. 91-420, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969); S. Rep. No. 91-985, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1970).
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even subject to local enforcement on the ground of violation of the
zoning ordinance. 22
The Park Service, understandably, has been no more zealous than
the Congress. Its recently revised Statement of Management policies reflects its assumption that Congress does not want it to exercise
regulatory authority over private inholdings. 23 The only discussion
of inholdings appears in a chapter entitled "Land Acquisition,"
which states that the mission of the Service to protect the parks "in
the long range . . . is best achieved when exploitative and private
uses are eliminated by acquisition of the property by the Federal
Government." 24 The management policy is limited to the following
four points: (1) The Park Service welcomes offers to sell private
inholdings to the United States; (2) It will not attempt to acquire
private lands through condemnation so long as they are devoted to
acceptable uses; (3) . If there are uses incompatible with park
management, the Service will attempt to negotiate with the owner
for acquisition; and (4) "In the event all reasonable efforts at negotiation fail, and the owner persists in his efforts to devote the
property to a use deemed by the Service to be adverse to the primary
purpose for which the area was established, the United States may
institute eminent domain proceedings to acquire the property." 25
The Park Service's published regulations, which are somewhat
more far-reaching, contain several provisions that could be used to
suppress the most troublesome private uses. They prohibit inholders from building structures in any park area or engaging in any
business unless authorized by a valid permit, contract, or written
agreement with the United States. 26 Another regulation provides
that "the creation or maintenance of a nuisance upon . . . any
private lands within a park area under the exclusive legislative juris22. In response to the situation at Fire Island, where the problem of variances
has been particularly severe, Senator Javits introduced legislation for direct enforcement (including denial of inconsistent variances) of local zoning laws by the Park
Service. However, this provision was stricken from the bill ultimately passed by both
Houses of Congress. See S. 867, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
The Senate Committee deleted the enforcement provision because "The Park Service has not completed its review for the final master plan for the seashore and the
Committee recommends that no action be taken on . . . injunctive authority until
the plan is complete." S. Rep. No. 94-735, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
23. Management Policies Report, supra note 3, at IX-1. In light of the federal
statutes noted above, see notes 19, 22 supra, that is hardly an unreasonable assumption. See also 16 U.S.C. § 460l-9(a)(l) (1970).
24. Management Policies Report, supra note 3, at IX-1.
25. Id. at IX-2, IX-3.
26. 36 C.F.R. §§ 5.3, 5.7 (1976).
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diction of the United States is prohibited." 27 Despite the potential
utility of these regulations, neither has been vigorously enforced with
a view to obtaining broad use controls on private lands within the
parks. 28
Regulation of lands beyond park boundaries has been even more
restrained. Only once did Congress give the Park Service explicit
authority to regulate outside lands; this was a short-lived effort to
control activity on Indian Reservation lands near Mesa Verde
National Park, authorization for which was repealed in 1913. 20 More
recently, Senator Goldwater proposed legislation to permit Park
Service control over national forest lands beyond the boundaries of
Grand Canyon National Park, but, after substantial opposition arose,
the provision was removed. 30
A few other legislative provisions reveal congressional recognition
of the adverse impact on the parks of activities on nearby private
lands, but they uniformly abjure the use of noncompensatory governmental regulation. Congress frequently authorizes and encourages
park officials to negotiate with municipal officials for the enactment
of local regulations that will protect park lands. 31 And, in a number
of cases, Congress has expressly given the Secretary special authority
to acquire additional lands in recognition of the problems created
by private activity on the peripheries of the parks. 32
Perhaps the best-known provision of this type, and certainly the
most litigated, 33 arose out of authority given the Park Service in
27. 36 C.F.R. § 5.13 (1976).
28. For an example of regulatory activity, see United States v. Carter, 339 F.
Supp. 1394 (D. Ariz. 1972). The Park Service seems to be most rigorous in regulating vehicle use. See text at note 139 infra.
29. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3607, § 2, 34 Stat. 61'7, repealed, Act of June
30, 1913, ch. 4, § 1, 38 Stat. 84. Cf. Act of Jan. 31, 1931, ch. 79, 46 Stat. 1053
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 8a-8e (1970)) (park access roads).
A novel approach is taken in Senator Kennedy's Nantucket Sound Islands Trust
bill, S. 67, H.R. 10307, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which is designed to provide
a framework for protection of park lands by control of development, without requiring federal acquisition.
30. S. 1296, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1973). See Grand Canyon National Park,
Hearings 011 S. 1296 Before the Subcomm. 011 Parks and Recreation of the Senate
Comm. 011 Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1973); S. Rep. No.
93-406, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. Con. Rep. No. 93-1611, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1374, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The enacted
law is the Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-620, 88 Stat. 2091 (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 227-28 (Supp. V 1975) ).
31. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460ff-3(f) (Supp. V 1975).
32. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 43000 (Supp. V 1975) (Antietem National Battlefield); 16 U.S.C. § 429b (1970) (Manassas National Battlefield). Cf. Act of Oct.
15, 1974, Pub. L No. 93-444, 88 Stat. 1304, S. Rep. No. 93-1041, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974) (protecting the view from Mount Vernon).
33. See note 5 supra,
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connection with private lands held by timber companies on the
borders of the Redwoods National Park. For all its notoriety,
however, the statutory language is not very daring. It simply states:
In order to afford as full protection as is reasonably possible to the
timber, soil, and streams within the boundaries of the park, the
Secretary is authorized . . . to acquire interests in land from, and
to enter into contracts and cooperative agreements with, the owners
of land on the periphery of the park and on watersheds tributary
to streams within the park designed to assure that the consequences
of . . . land use . . . will not adversely affect the timber, soil, and
streams within the park . . . .34
This provision became the subject of notable litigation not because
it gave the Secretary unusual authority over land beyond park
boundaries, but because the Sierra Club succeeded in persuading a
court that the statute permitted private citizens to sue the Secretary
to force him to implement the provision quoted above. 35
Whether the extremely restrained posture that has thus far characterized the Congress and the Park Service is necessary or appropriate
is a question to which we shall soon turn. First, though, it will be
useful to examine the legal advice that has shaped the passive role
of the Park Service.

Ill.

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE PARK SERVICE:
THE VIEW FROM WITHIN

Traditionally, state cessions of jurisdiction have been considered
the only basis for federal jurisdiction over private lands. Because
34. 16 U.S.C. § 79c3 (e) (1970).
35. See cases cited note 5 supra; Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 570, 572
(9th Cir. 1971): "A permissive statutory term, like 'as he may deem just and proper'
. . . is not by itself to be read as a congressional command precluding judicial review. . . . His decisions to regulate or not to regulate in any particular instance,
as well as the particular mode of regulation chosen-is to be determined by reference
to these [statutory] objectives." See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972), discussed in text at note 116 infra; Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
In Biderman v. Morton, Civil No. 72 C 1060 (E.D.N.Y., Memorandum and Order of Feb. 6, 1973, at 22), the court, in response to a citizen initiated suit seeking
to require the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate vehicle regulations at Fire Island National Seashore, concluded,
[fhe issue] seems an odd one to present to a court . . . it appears to be a
matter within the discretion of the Secretary. . . . [f]he action of the Secretary, it is suggested, is based on his belief of his legal incompetency to act in
the premises, [but] whether or not such a legal incompetency does exist is a
matter which is not determined by the Secretary but by the interpretation of the
law to which he is giving effect.
Contrast Izaak Walton League v. AEC, 533 F.2d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 1976):
"But even assuming the Department of Interior, by exercising its statutory power
of supervision over the National Lakeshore . . . could obtain injunctive relief against
threatened irreparable injury to lands within its custody from sources outside, we
could not justify interruption . . . when the Department has not sought such relief."
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the so-called cession clause is one of the least-known provisions of
the Constitution, 36 some explanation of it is appropriate, and must
begin with recognition of the fact that even federal ownership of
land does not ipso facto create federal legislative authority over that
land. In the absence of a cession, the states retain the general police
power over federally owned lands, such-as parks, and, consequently,
over privately owned lands within and without park boundaries. 37 Of
course, the United States may govern its own land to the extent necessary to implement its granted powers-for example, the property
power3 8 or the war power. 39 To that extent, the federal government
may displace inconsistent state law by means of the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. 40 This article will show that these granted powers also give it authority over privately owned lands.
Under the cession clause of the Constitution, a state may cede
general legislative jurisdiction to the federal government.41 The
states routinely make such cessions for federally owned lands within
the parks. 42 The courts have held that if a state makes a cession
for a park without retaining jurisdiction over privately owned land,
then general legislative jurisdiction for all land, public and private,
within the boundaries of the park is ceded to the United States. 43
In such instances, therefore, there is no constitutional problem;
the federal government is clearly authorized to exercise the full
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. See generally REPORT OF TIIE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE
STATES, JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, PART II, A TEXT
OF THE LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION (1957),
37. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963). The United States must
assent to the cession. 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1970). See also United States v. Carmack,
329 U.S. 230, 240-41 n.10 (1946); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525,
537-39 (1885); cf. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1937);
Mason v. Tax Commr., 302 U.S. 186 (1937).
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, els. 11-14.
40. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285 (1976); Utah Power & Light
Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 403-05 (1917); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe,
114 U.S. 525 (1885); United States v. Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Wash. 1941),
41. See note 37 supra. The cession clause, despite its limited language, has been
held to apply to national parks. See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304
U.S. 518 (1938). It also operates as to land purchased or condemned by the United
States, and to the original public domain. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct.
2285 (1976); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
42. State laws enacted whenever a unit of the national park system is established
explicitly make such cessions. See, e.g., authorities cited notes 44, 45 infra.
43. See United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930); United States v. Peterson,
91 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1950), aftd., 191 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 885 (1951); United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1963); OP.
SoL., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, 60 I.D. 169 (1948), 54 I.D. 483 (1934), Op.
Sol. M-33679 (June 29, 1944).
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range of police power jurisdiction, including ordinary zoning, over
all land within the park boundaries.
If all cessions made by the states included privately owned land,
no question of constitutional authority would arise as to private
inholdings, and we would have to consider only the question of
federal authority for land beyond park boundaries. This is not the
case, however. State cessions vary considerably in their wording.
Some clearly do not cede jurisdiction over private inholdings, 44 and
some are at best ambiguous. 45 Thus, it must be concluded that the
cession clause cannot, in a general sense, be expected to resolve
the issue of federal authority even for private lands within park
boundaries; of course, it does not affect at all the problem of regulating lands external to the parks.
It is at this point that the question of Park Service authority arises.
The Service's own perception of whether it n:iay regulate unceded
private lands within and without the parks is instructive. In 1966,
it questioned the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
concerning the constitutionality of imposing federal zoning on private
lands within an area that had been authorized as a park, but for which
no cession of state legislative jurisdiction had yet been made. 46 After
referring to a 1936 decision of the Supreme Court that set out a
rather rigorous test of "national concern" as a precondition for the
valid exercise of federal authority, 47 the Solicitor, in a monument of
understatement, conceded that "a certain amount of liberalization in
favor of extended Federal power is readily noticeable in subsequent
court decisions." 48 Nonetheless, he concluded that the proposed federal zoning would be invalid:
44. See Halpert v. Udall, 231 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Fla. 1964), affd., 379 U.S.
645 (1965) (Everglades National Park); Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 288 (1925)
(Rocky Mountain National Park); MASS, ANN. LAws ch. 777, § 4(1) (1962) (Cape
Cod National Seashore).
45. TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 5247, § 8 (1974) (Big Bend National Park);
NEW YoRK UNCONSOL. LAWS § 50-a (McKinney 1975) (Fire Island National Seashore).
Exclusive jurisdiction is not uniformly ceded to the United States • . . . Of the
287 areas of the [Park] System, only about 72 have exclusive jurisdiction . • . •
When the States cede exclusive jurisdiction, such cession normally covers all
lands within the authorized boundary of the park, including private inholdings • . . • In most instances the State acts ceding jurisdiction provide that the
cession shall extend to future additions to the park.
Letter from D. Briggle, Acting Director, National Park Service, to Joseph L Sax,
L58-LL, Aug. 12, 1976 (on file at Michigan Law Review).
46. The request is described in Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Parks and
Recreation, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Assistant to the Director, National
Park Service, Subject, Federal Zoning, File A-66-2057.18, Nov. 17, 1966, at 1
[hereinafter cited as Parks & Recreation Memorandum].
47. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1936).
48. Parks & Recreation Memorandum, supra note 46, at 3.
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Since zoning involves a purely local situation, and since it is difficult, if not impossible, to justify the Federal zoning power in connection with any constitutionally granted power, it is our opinion that
in the absence of a cession by a State and acceptance by the United
States of legislative jurisdiction over a specific area authorized for
Federal administration, the zoning statute suggested in your memorandum would be held to be unconstitutional. 40

In the following years, the Park Service was severely challenged
by the projected building of the Gettysburg Tower, which it viewed
as a serious desecration of the battlefield site. 60 In 1971, the
Service sought its Solicitor's support for a plan to bring suit to enjoin
the tower's construction. 1a The Solicitor responded that "[a]fter
much study of the problem, we have concluded there is no basis for
Federal action in the courts to enjoin the proposed construction.'' 62
Interestingly, though the Solicitor was unwilling to recommend
court action, he did not specifically say that the Park Service was
constitutionally barred from acting. At some point in the early
1970s, constitutional reservations within the Department of the Interior apparently dissipated for, despite its Solicitor's advice, the
Department thereafter asked the Department of Justice to consider
bringing a common-law nuisance action to enjoin construction of the
Gettysburg tower. 63 No such action was ever initiated, however, for
reasons that have never been revealed; instead the Park Service
later agreed to a compromise under which the tower would be built
at a somewhat greater distance from the battlefield site. 64
In 1976, following rather strong judicial criticism in the Sierra
Club's Redwoods National Park case, 55 the Park Service sufficiently
overcame its constitutional reservations to ask Congress, relying
upon the property clause of the Constitution, to give it explicit authority to regulate private activity beyond the boundaries of the Redwoods National Park. 56 But the bill was never submitted to Congress
49. Id.
50. See note 8 supra.
51. The request is noted in Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Parks and
Recreation, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Nathanial P. Reed, Assistant Secretary, Subject, Gettysburg Observation Tower, File 44552.2817, April 30, 1971, at 1.
52. Id.
53. Letter from Mitchell Melich, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to The
Attorney General, June 23, 1971.
54. Pennsylvania v. Morton, Civil No. 2188-73, Affidavit of Nathanial P. Reed,
at 13-16 (D.D.C. 1973).
55. See note 5 supra.
56. The undated draft of the Interior Department's bill, which exists only in typescript copy, reads as follows:
That the Congress hereby finds and declares that significant examples of the
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because the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), which reviews all proposed Department legislation, made the following determination:
During the interagency review of this legislation, a substantive
problem was identified which is of concern to us. By attempting to
extend the degree to which the Federal Government can regulate
the use of private property without creating a compensable taking,
the bill would provide for a precedential and major expansion of the
property clause of the U.S. Constitution which we believe should
not be undertaken,
In light of the above . . . we plan no further action on the draft
biU.57

The 0MB letter is puzzling, to say the least. In contrast to the
traditional view, which was that the property clause did not grant
authority to regulate lands outside park boundaries, 0MB presented
a different reason for believin_g that the proposed Redwoods legislation would be unconstitutional: It suggested that exercise of this
primeval coastal redwood in that portion of Redwood National Park in Redwood
Creek basin, Humboldt County, California, which, pursuant to the Act of
October 2, 1968 (82 Stat. 931 ), were acquired by the United States for purposes
of public inspiration, enjoyment, and scientific study, will be irreparably lost
unless reasonable timber harvest regulations and other practices, including reasonable restrictions on harvesting of timber, on watersheds tributary to streams
within the Redwood Creek portion of the park, and on watersheds tributary to
streams entering Redwood Creek above Redwci'od National Park, are implemented and enforced; "that, in order fully to implement the purposes of the Act
of October 2, 1968, the full authority of the Congress under Article IV, Section
3, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States must be, and by this Act
hereby is, exercised to protect the Federal property within that portion of Redwood National Park in the Redwood Creek basin; and, that, § 3(e) of the
Redwood National Park Act is amended by adding the following provision:
The Secretary of the Interior is further authorized to identify and establish
zones outside the boundary of Redwood National Park but within watersheds
tributary to streams within that portion of the park in the Redwood Creek basin,
and on watersheds tributary to streams entering Redwood Creek above Redwood
National Park, encompassing areas where the Secretary h_as determined that
timber harvest and other practices, if not subjected to reasonable regulations,
constitute a threat to federally-owned resources within the park. The Secretary
shall promulgate and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations, including
reasonable restrictions on harvesting of timber, within such zones as are necessary to provide continuing protection to the lands and other resources within
the park. Provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall be considered
as authority to acquire lands or interests in lands within such zones through the
adoption of such rules and regulations; and, provided further, that any regulation adopted by the Secretary that is deemed by a court of competent jurisdiction
to require the taking of a property interest compensable under Article 5 of the
Constitution of the United States shall be of no effect. Failure to comply with
rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary pursuant to this authority shall
be punished as a misdemeanor as provided by 16 U.S.C. § 3. The Secretary is
further directed to request that the Department of Justice initiate a suit for
injunctive relief for any violation or anticipated violation of regulations adopted
hereunder. For state regulation, see 7 ELR 10040 (March 1977).
•
57. Letter from James M. Frey, Assistant Director for Legislative Reference, Office of Management and Budget (0MB), to Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary of the
Interior, April 7, 1976. OMB's authority is predicated on 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1970),
Exec. Order No. 11,541, 3 C.F.R. 141 (1970), and 0MB Circqlar A-19 (1970).
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regulatory authority might violate the fifth amendment, which prohibits the taking of private property without just compensation. In
light of the far-reaching regulation that has been sustained by the
Supreme Court as consistent with that amendment, Gs OMB's
implication that the proposed Redwoods bill might fail as an
uncompensated taking is at best dubious.Go Nonetheless, the Park
Service at present seems uncertain about its authority under the
property clause, reluctant to rely upon the expansion of the commerce clause witnessed by the last four decades, and uneasy about
whether regulation of a sort long recognized as well within the police
power might be viewed as a violation of the taking clause.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

The preceding section suggested some serious flaws in the
reasoning of Park Service legal advisers, who have concluded that
the federal government may not constitutionally regulate private
holdings beyond park boundaries. This section addresses the four
constitutional questions raised by proposals for Park Service regulation of private land. First, under what provisions of the Constitution may the federal government be said to have authority to regulate private landowners? Second, how far-reaching is that
authority-does it, for example, allow exercise of the general zoning
power? Third, in so far as federal authority is limited, to what extent is it limited by the rights of private property owners and to what
extent by principles of allocation of legislative authority between the
states and the United States? And, finally, is there any constitutional basis for distinguishing between regulation of private inholdings within the parks and regulation of private lands beyond park
boundaries? These questions will be answered by considering the
relevant sources of constitutional authority.
A. The Property Clause
It is easy enough to demonstrate that fears of an absolute constitutional bar to federal regulation of private lands are misplaced.
58. See, e.g., Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); Goldblatt
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). See generally Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights,
81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
59. Perhaps 0MB was affected by the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Curtin
v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911), holding that regulation of grazing on private land
within Yosemite National Park was a taking. To the extent that the Curtin decision
retains any vitality, it should be read to emphasize the severe diminution of value
that was present in that case. 222 U.S. at 86. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); note 58 supra.

December 1976]

The National Parks

251

Fifty years ago, in United States v. Alford, 60 Justice Holmes relied
o,n the property clause to uphold the prosecution, under a federal
statute, of an individual who had started a fire on private land adjacent to a national forest. Holmes flatly rejected the argument that
a statute regulating conduct engaged in upon private land was
unconstitutional: "The statute is constitutional. Congress may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the
publicly owned forests." 61 Obviously, as Justice Holmes indicated,
forest fires do not stop at the boundary lines of publicly owned
forests. While Congress plainly may protect its forests from fire, just
as plainly, it cannot be required to insure their protection by
extending federal ownership, for unless the public domain is to run
from sea to sea there must inevitably be private land just at the edge
of the public boundary line. All this Holmes encapsulated in his
observation that "[t]he danger depends upon the nearness of the
fire not upon the ownership of the land where it is built." 62
Holmes relied upon an earlier case that had set the tone for a
generous interpretation of the property clause. In Camfield v.
United States, 63 the United States had granted odd-numbered
sections of land to a private proprietor and retained for itself the
even-numbered sections. By skillfully building fences just on his
own sections near the property boundary lines, the proprietor succeeded in enclosing the entire tract. A federal statute prohibited
the enclosure of federal lands, and the United States sued to compel
removal of the fences. The defense asserted that if the statute were
interpreted to prohibit building fences on private property, it must
be declared unconstitutional.
The Camfield Court recognized that a decision for the government might be read as expanding the property clause to give the
United States general :police power within the states. But it considered the defendant's conduct to be nothing less than a nuisance
under the general principles of the common law, and found intoler60. 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
61. 274 U.S. at 267. Federal regulation of private land external to federal enclaves has also been sustained under the war power, the treaty power, and the commerce power. See McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919) (authorizing
the Secretary of War to suppress houses of prostitution within such distance of any
military camp as he deemed necessary) (see also 18 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970)); Bailey
v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior
to control hunting on private land adjacent to Back Bay Migratory Waterfowl
Refuge in Virginia).
62. 274 U.S. at 267.
63. 167 U.S. S18 (1897).
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able the prospect of the federal government having something less
than the rights of an ordinary proprietor to abate a nuisance. Equally
intolerable would be the incapacity of the federal government to
vindicate that right by using its own laws. The Court said:
While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited
power to legislate against nuisances within a State which it would
have within a Territory, we do not think the admission of a Territory
as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection
of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what
is ordinarily known as the "police power," so long as such power is
directed solely to its own protection. A different rule would place the
public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state
legislation. 04
The Alford and Camfield cases establish unambiguously that the
property clause permits federal regulation of private land; indeed,
in 1976 the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed Camfield, stating
that "the power granted by the property clause is broad enough to
reach beyond territorial limits." 05 To the extent that the conduct
in question can broadly be characterized as a common-law type of
wrong-such as trespass or nuisance-or can be said to imperil the
public lands, or to impede protection of those lands, it is now beyond
controversy that federal regulation is appropriate under the property
power, whether or not jurisdiction over the regulated land has been
ceded by the state. Moreover, it is clear that Congress need not
depend upon state law for substantive rules prohibiting such
conduct. 06
Certainly most of the activity on private land that the Park Service
needs to regulate would fit comfortably within the holdings of the
Alford and Camfield cases. 67 Even further scope is given the
property clause in the Court's recent decision in Kleppe v. New
Mexico. 68 While that case dealt with regulation of wild animals on
64. 167 U.S. at 525-26.
65. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 2291 (1976). Other cases are cited
in Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
66. See text at notes 63, 65 supra; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40
(1947).
67. See examples in text at notes 7-14 supra. For instance, the Solicitor of the
Interior Department sent the Department of Justice a memorandum attached to a
letter, note 53 supra, urging that a common-law nuisance action could be won in
the Gettysburg Tower controversy. The Department also has researched a nuisance
suit on the Redwoods National Park situation. Letter from Michele B. Metrinko,
Associate Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior, to John G. Sobetzer, March
11, 1976.
68. 96 S. Ct. 2285 (1976).
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publicly owned land, the Court held that the property clause was not
limited to regulation required to "protect the public land from
damage." 00 Even where no damage is anticipated, the property
clause enables Congress to enact a statute, the stated purpose of
which is "to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological
balance on the public lands. " 70
The ultimate reach of the property power as to private lands,
however, was left open by Kleppe, as it had been by Camfield. In
Kleppe the Court indicated the potential limit of the property clause
by expressly reserving judgment on whether federal regulation of
wild horses on private land would be proper simply because they
had "at any time set foot upon federal land. " 71 But this is only to
suggest the obvious, that "the Property Clause does not authorize
an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State." 72
The difficult questions that remain may be illustrated by reference
to the situation at Fire Island. 78 If Congress had gone beyond the
sword-of-Damocles law now in effect and authorized the Secretary
to impose routine zoning directly on private owners "by means of
acreage, frontage, and setback requirements," 74 would such regulation be within the constitutional scope of the property power? No
satisfactory answer to this question can be drawn simply by analysis
of decided cases. Plainly, such regulation would go further than that
sustained by the Court in cases like Alford and Camfield, for it
neither presents the obvious peril of the forest fire, nor necessarily
embraces the nuisance-like conduct the Court found in Camfield.
Nonetheless, it would doubtless be possible for the Park Service
to demonstrate that even such routine zoning was appropriate to
protect the uses that Congress sought to promote in establishing the
park. If Congress itself were to make that determination of
needfulness, it is highly unlikely that the Court would interpose its
own judgment as to what sort of regulation was appropriate for the
protection and maintenance of a national park. 75
69. 96 S. Ct. at 2290.
70. 96 S. Ct. at 2287. See also New Mexico State Game Commn. v. Udall, 410
F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969); United States v.
Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970).
71. 96 S. Ct. at 2295.
72. 96 S. Ct. at 2292. The Court, however, studiously ignored New Mexico's
effort to base a claim on the tenth amendment. See Appellee's Motion to Dismiss
or Affirm at 25.
73. See text at notes 19-22 supra; note 19 supra.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 459e-2(b) (1970).
75. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 2290-91 (1976).
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Reading congressional power narrowly, so that Congress must buy
troublesome lands rather than regulating them, is not a satisfactory
solution.· Certainly this interpretation is not required as a fifth
amendment matter, for the sort of zoning in question is no more a
taking of property when imposed by the Congress than it is when
imposed by a local government. Moreover, as Justice Holmes noted
in the Alford case, acquisition is not a practicable solution to these
problems, for no matter how much the federal government buys,
there will always be problems of conflicting use just at the border
of the federal enclave. One can move the situs of the problem by
acquisition, but the problem itself will remain.
To read the property clause very broadly, however, also presents
a problem-wide-ranging displacement of traditional state land
regulation. There is no doubt that federal zoning of inholdings and
peripheral lands would invade an area long reserved to state and
local regulation. As a practical matter, this concern is mitigated by
the fact that the foreseeable needs of the Park Service will not
likely rise to the level of "general control over public policy in a
State." Indeed, to the extent that general zoning power of the Fire
Island type is limited to private lands within park boundaries, 70 the
expansive possibilities of the property clause are self-constraining. 77
At the broadest level of concern, the question is one of the general
relation between the federal government and the states. Every
expansion of the property clause increases the power of the federal
government at the expense of the states' authority, and by the traditional jurisprudence of federalism that is cause for unease. But
one may ask whether the property clause and the problems of the
Park Service provide an appropriate setting in which to seek resto76. The policy proposal set forth below is so limited. See text at note 122 infra.
77. Another self-limiting rationale for the use of the property clause to regulate
peripheral private uses could be drawn from an analogy to the Court's evolution of
a federal common law of nuisance in cases involving interstate pollution. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 (1907). In those cases the Court found that a state, having a sovereign
interest in the protection of its natural resources, must be viewed as entitled to protection against threats "by the acts of persons beyond its control." 406 U.S. at 104.
It can hardly be suggested that the United States has less interest in the protection
of federal enclaves against such injuries by private landowners "beyond its control"
than does one state against a city in another state or a state against a private industry
in another state. The constitutional means by which the federal government can
protect that interest is an interpretation of the property clause sufficiently broad to
ensure "that the forests on its mountains . . . should not be further destroyed" by
private action beyond the borders of its own landholdings. See Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,237 (1907).
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ration of a relationship between the states and the federal government that has long been disavowed in the face of other exercises
of national authority.
The courts have decided many cases more sharply intrusive upon
traditional state power than anything one might anticipate in the area
of Park Service regulation. Congress has displaced fundamental
principles of state water law with the federal reclamation program. 78
A municipal licensee of the Federal Power Commission has been
authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain in contravention
of state law. 79 States have been barred from applying their conservation laws to a federally licensed dam. 8 ° Federal criminal laws
have become pervasive. 81 The federal government has displaced
state literacy requirements for determining voter qualifications. 82
Local governments have been preempted from imposing curfews at
airports in their own cities83 and from applying their own safety
standards for nuclear power plants. 84 Of special interest is the
whole panoply of national air, water, and noise control laws that have
created effective federal land use regulation far more pervasive than
any regulatory authority to which the Park Service will conceivably
aspire. 85
Indeed, in assessing the scope of the property clause as it affects
our federal system of government, it is necessary to consider the
authority the United States has exerted under the commerce power.
It is not only anomalous to apply sharply divergent theories of
federal-state relations in interpreting the two constitutional provisions, but it must also be remembered that the commerce clause
itself is a potential source of federal authority for the regulation of
private activi·.:y that intrudes upon management of the national parks.
78. See, e.g., City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrig.
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
79. Washington v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1953); cf. Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
80. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
81. See, e.g., Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Hoke
v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
See Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime,
15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271 (1973).
82. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
83. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973 ).
84. Minnesota v. Northern States Power Co., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), affg. 447
F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
85. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970); 42 U.S.C.
§ 4901 (1970).

256

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:239

B. The Commerce Clause

Although the national parks have been established under the
property clause, 86 there is no reason to conclude that the federal
government is barred from protecting the uses of the parks, which
assuredly involve commerce among the states, under the Constitution's
commerce clause. 87
No provision of the Constitution has been read to give more extensive authority to Congress than the commerce clause. With a
single distinctive exception, 88 the Supreme Court has not struck
down a congressional exercise of power under that clause for
four decades. The Court noted explicitly that the exception, involving federal regulation of state employees, is not to be taken as
signalling a departure from the Court's long-standing recognition that
broad congressional regulation of private enterprise under the commerce clause is constitutional. 80
86. The constitutional basis for the establishment of National Parks is actually
rather hazy. To the extent that parks were carved out of the original public domain,
they have benefited from the long established view that congressional power over
the public lands is plenary, and will not be examined by the courts. See Light v.
United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S.
16, 29-30 (1940); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954); Utah Power & Light
Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917). Where the United States must acquire
land for the parks, it can rely upon United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339
U.S. 725 (1950), which sustained the federal reclamation program as an exercise
of the power to spend for the general welfare. The closest case factually is United
States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681, 683 (1896), which upheld the
condemnation of land for the Gettysburg battlefield memorial. For a very broad
modem view of the federal condemnation power, see United States ex rel. TVA v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946). The Supreme Court has never passed on
condemnation of land for a "natural" national park.
The laws establishing individual national parks, 16 U.S.C. §·§ 21-460 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. V 1975), and the organic act creating the National Park Service,
16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975) do not invoke any constitutional
power of the Congress. However, 16 U.S.C. § la-I (1970), which sets out a declaration of findings and purpose for the national park system, is reminiscent of the
sentiments expressed in United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681,
68'.3 (1896).
81. See generally Soper, supra note 65, at 22-27. In Kleppe v. New Mexico,
96 S. Ct. 2285 (1966), the United States argued that the Wild Free-Roaming Horses
and Burros Act, which was intended "to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands" was sustainable under the commerce clause.
However, the Court found it unnecessary to reach this question because it sustained
the Act under the property clause. 96 S. Ct. at 2289.
88. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
89. In Usery, the majority made clear that it adhered to a very expansive inter•
pretation of the commerce clause, and rejected only legislation in which "Congress
seeks to regulate directly the activities of States as public employers." 96 S. Ct.
at 2469. Nothing in the case suggests that any member of the Court stands ready
to question federal regulation of private activity.
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Were Congress to regulate land use within or beyond park
boundaries based on its commerce power, its action would, upon the
following rationale, fall comfortably within the range of regulation
sustained by the decided cases. Travel to and use of the parks
clearly constitutes substantial interstate commerce. 0° Furthermore,
it is rational to find that certain activity carried on within or near
park boundaries causes an impairment of the quality of the experience for which interstate travel was undertaken. 01 The use of
constitutional power to protect the quality of commerce, as well as
its magnitude, is well established. 92 Moreover, Congress may
protect the ultimate "consumer activity" that occurs after the interstate commerce itself has come to an end. 93
The fact that the activity is itself quite local in nature, 94 or is not
itself a part of commercial dealings, 95 or is even-when viewed
alone-trivialu 6 in relation to commerce among the states, does not
invalidate the federal power. For the question is not whether the
activity itself is an element of interstate commerce, but whether commerce is "pinched" by the activity07 or by a class of activities of which
an individual instance may itself be a trifling part whose contribution
has not been proven. 98 It is sufficient if the regulated activity
utilizes goods that have been transported in commerce, even though
the activity itself does not, in any way, serve the interstate travellers
who use the parks. 00 Nor is congressional authority invalid simply
90. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
91. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (Redwoods National Park); Pennsylvania v. Morton, Civil No. 2188-73 (D.D.C. 1973) (affidavit of Nathaniel P. Reed
at 3, 6) (Gettysburg National Military Park). On the limited evidence required
to support the finding, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
92. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 381 (1946). See also Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Just as Congress, with plenary power over the District
of Columbia, may legislate to sustain the quality of life there, so, it would seem,
may Congress, with full authority over the parks and the interstate travel to them,
legislate broadly to protect the quality of the park experien~e. Cf. Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R.R.,
413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1969).
93. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
94. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975); Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
95. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
96. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
97. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Assn., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
98. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
99. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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because, in fulfilling a legitimate federal purpose, it occupies an area
that has traditionally been left to state regulation. 10° Finally, even
when a congressional decision seems strained or doubtful, or a particular application seems unwisely included within the congressional
scheme of regulation, the role of the courts in assessing the judgment
of Congress is extraordinarily limited; the judiciary will intervene
only where the legislative decision is regarded as irrational. 101
It is hardly conceivable that any Supreme Court that has sat in
the last four decades would strike down an explicit congressional
effort to protect national parks by imposing conventional restraints on
the use of land by private owners near park boundaries. Justice
Stewart's lonely dissent in the recent Perez case, in which he complained that "it is not enough to say that loan sharking has interstate
characteristics . . . for interstate business suffers from almost all
criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the streets," 102 indicates just how little attention the Court will pay to a claim that
regulation of a particular private activity is traditionally reserved for
state regulation.
V.

A PROPOSED FEDERAL POLICY

A.

Preliminary Considerations

The preceding pages ought to make clear the ample power of
Congress to give the Park Service broad regulatory authority over
private lands within and near park boundaries. At the same time,
it is apparent that intrusion upon traditional local land use regulation.
presents practical and political concerns that must be taken into
account during the formulation of a policy for the Park Service.
The long-standing reluctance of Congress to give significant regulatory
authority to the Park Service is a revealing measure of that concern.
The problem, then, is to devise a regulatory policy Congress might
enact that is both responsive to the needs of the national parks and
yet not unwisely incursive upon the traditions of local land use
control.
Before turning specifically to proposals for new legislation,
however, two preliminary questions should briefly be considered.
The first is whether new legislation is actually needed to implement
100. See text at notes 78-84 supra.
101. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S.
583, 594 (1939); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
102. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971),
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an appropriate federal program for the regulation of private lands;
the second is how the federal government ought to define its
responsibilities as the trustee of national park lands.
1. The Need for Legislation

It might be argued that congressional passivity in the face of
serious threats to the parks constitutes an abdication of a fundamental legislative responsibility to preserve park and seashore lands
that are held in trust by the federal government on behalf of all
present and future citizens. Some support for this argument may
be found in the nineteenth century case of Illinois Central Railroad
v. Illinois, 103 where the Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois
legislature's extensive grant to a private company of submerged
lands along the Chicago waterfront. 104 The Court declared that the
legislature could not relinquish management and control of
"property in which the public has an interest,"105 which in this case
was free navigation and commerce over Lake Michigan. Although
the case lends support to the doctrine of public trust, it does not
provide a conclusive precedent for regarding Congress as constitutionally bound to legislate to protect the parks. There is a good
deal of difference between invalidating a dubious state land grant and
forcing the Congress to enact protective regulation; indeed, the
judiciary has already demonstrated its reluctance to impose constitutional duties on the Congress with respect to its management of
the public lands. 106
Alternatively, it might be argued that the public trust argument,
whatever its merits, is academic because the Park Service has already
been granted authority to protect the parks from private uses. Yet
the authority that Congress intends the Service to have is, at best,
uncertain. The conventional view is that Congress has manifested
an intent not to regulate private lands, and there is abundant evidence to support that proposition.107 At the same time, the broad
protective mandate given in the National Parks Organic Act108 indicates that Congress does not intend to leave the parks wholly at the
103. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
104. A discussion of this case and its implications is included in Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REv. 471, 489-91 (1970).
105. 146 U.S. at 453.
106. See authorities cited note ·86 supra.
107. See text at notes 19-32 supra.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975).
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mercy of private landowners. 100 Nor is there anything in the statutory law to suggest that resort to litigation, which produced victories
in the Alford110 and Camfield 111 cases, was meant to be disavowed.
Thus, the congressional intent, as best it can be discerned, seems
to be that acquisition is the preferred solution for conflicts between
the Park Service and private landowners, but that the parks should
not be worse off than a private landowner would be when faced with
traditional problems such as trespass and nuisance. Specifically, the
Service seems free to litigate to abate such problems if other
solutions fail. The Redwoods Park law 112 and the sword-ofDamocles laws, 113 for all their restrictive language, are consistent
with this interpretation. Indeed, it has already been noted that the
Park Service believed it could have initiated a lawsuit to prevent
construction of the Gettysburg Tower.
Whatever the current status of congressional authorization, legislation is certainly desirable, both to clarify the Service's authority to
litigate and to establish its power to promulgate regulations
governing private conduct of the sort that regularly harms the parks.
Litigation can provide only an interim remedy for a problem that
clearly needs legislative attention.
2. The Responsibilities of a Trustee of the Public Lands
In order to enact legislation, Congress must decide the scope of
responsibility it wishes to impose upon the Secretary of the Interior
as trustee ·of the national park lands. 114 Precedents are not
abundant in this area of the law, 116 but a recent Indian trust case
provides a striking parallel to the national parks problem. While
Indian law is distinctive, based as it is upon a sense of profound
obligation to those native Americans whose lives and culture the
109. While the Organic Act was enacted at a time when federal powers were
thought to be very limited, the reach of an Act may expand along with expanding
notions of congressional authority. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp.,
96 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 n. 2 (1976).
110. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927), discussed in text at notes 6062 supra.
111. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), discussed in text at notes
63-65 supra.
112. See note 5 supra.
113. See note 19 supra.
114. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917).
115. See generally E. PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 112-13
(1951); Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Application in the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WILLAMETTE L.J,
135, 136.
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federal government utterly overwhelmed, the case of Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe v. Morton 116 nonetheless provides an example that
Congress might profitably follow.
The Indians' traditional livelihood as fishermen was dependent
upon the water in Pyramid Lake, a desert water body within the
Reservation that was fed almost exclusively by inflow from the
Carson River. Upstream on the Carson were many farmers who
used the river's water for irrigation under contracts made with the
Secretary of the Interior as part of the federal reclamation program.
Over the years, as more and more water was taken for irrigation,
the level of Pyramid Lake dropped severely, threatening the Indian
uses.
In a suit brought against the Secretary, the Indians claimed that
he had violated his trust obligation to assure water to the Reservation. The plaintiffs conceded that the irrigators had property
rights under their water supply contract with the Secretary, but
claimed that he was giving the farmers more water than they needed,
and more than they were legally entitled to get under either their
contract or the applicable principles of western water law. The
Secretary sought to compromise the case by reducing irrigation uses
somewhat, but the Court held that the Secretary had a legal duty
to the Indians that he could not blunt with a politically expedient
effort to placate the contending users.
The decision was striking in a number of respects, including its discussion of the Secretary's duty, which is of particular interest for our
purposes. First, the Court held that the Secretary was duty-bound
to act for the benefit of the Reservation against the private users. 117
Second, it held that the Secretary must take advantage of available
legal doctrine, which, under the general theory of water law, gives
no right to waste water, even if specific amounts are included in a
water supply contract. Third, the Court compelled the Secretary to
pursue this argument not only against his judgment, but in a situation
where the legal rights in question are very rarely exercised, for the
rules against waste are among the least-enforced strictures in water
law. 118 Finally, the Court determined for itself that the irrigators'
uses were wasteful and that the Secretary had taken no steps to
reduce irrigation uses to nonwasteful levels; in making these
116. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
117. For the limits of Secretarial discretion, see note 35 supra.
118. C. MEYERS & D. TARLOCK, WATER REsOURCE MANAGEMENT 108 (1971);
J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 271-80 (1968).
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determinations the Court enforced the principle much more rigorously than is usual under state law. 119
The decision in the Pyramid Lake case is fully in accord with the
tradition established in the Supreme Court's early public domain
cases, such as Alford and Camfield. 120 An explication of this tradition begins with the proposition that the federal government
should not hesitate to regulate private property owners for the protection of the public domain. The specifics of that protection ought
to be contained in federal rules designed for the reasonable
protection of the public lands. In fairness, those federal rules ought
to draw upon established principles of American law. Administrative officials should uphold this trust with the full rigor that these
principles permit, and their duty is enforceable by those who use the
lands should there be a slackening of vigorous implementation of
the protective mandate by federal officials.121

B. Characteristics of the Proposed Federal Policy
A workable federal policy must include rules for the regulation
of private land both within and without park boundaries; it must also
include a rationale for determining how those boundaries ought to
be defined. Finally, such a policy should contain guidelines for
determining when the United States ought to acquire, rather than
regulate, private lands.
The plan to be proposed here would allow the federal government
to exercise the police power over private lands within park boundaries to the full extent necessary to protect and maintain park lands
and uses included in the laws establishing the park. 122 Beyond park
119. The usual cases allow appalling amounts of water to be wasted. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 239 (1940); Corpus Christi
v. Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955). Even in the rare cases where
waste is enjoined, only the most blatant departures from good husbandry have usually
been prevented. See, e.g., Doherty v. Pratt, 34 Nev. 343, 124 P. 574 (1912). A
recent California case may foretell a much-needed change in judicial attitudes on
waste, but it is certainly not yet the standard state approach. See Environmental
Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 8 ERC 1535 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 1, 1975).
120. See text at notes 60-65 supra.
121. See note 35 supra. The Congress should make clear that the protective
mandate is not unfettered discretion, but is instead law to be applied. See Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971).
122. For the authority to delegate rule-making to administrative officials, see
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1910). For an unconventional and unpersuasive view of possible limits on that authority, see Williams, The National Park
Service's Master Plan: An Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power?, 11
N.E.L. REV. 7 (1975).
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boundaries, the federal government ought to regulate private lands
only to restrain conduct that broadly can be characterized as
nuisance-like activity. In order to understand this distinction, it is
necessary first to say something about the significance cf park
boundaries.
1. The Problem of Park Boundary Lines

Because the early national parks were carved out of a larger
public domain, in which virtually all the land was owned by the
United States, 123 park boundaries originally represented a decision
to withdraw certain areas from the geµeral rules of settlement and
mining that governed federal lands. 124 Later, as parks were
established in areas where substantial private holdings existed, the
boundary lines identified those areas that were to be acquired by
the United States for inclusion in a park. 125
As more park units were established in which significant private
landholdings seemed likely to remain, 126 there arose a need to develop a managerial policy for private inholdings and to rationalize
that policy with one for private holdings outside park boundaries.
Unfortunately, this need has never been satisfied, and the result is
administrative chaos. The managerial and legal rules that apply to
inholdings are different from those that govern peripheral lands, and
the rules applicable to private inholders differ among the various
parks. As noted earlier, the states have ceded exclusive legislative
authority to the United States over private inholdings in some parks;
there the federal government recognizes its right to exercise directly
123. There were some early exceptions, such as the Rocky Mountain National
Park, where there were "many thousands of acres in the park owned by private persons." Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 229 (1925). See 16 U.S.C. § 194 (1970).
124. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-302 (1970) (Homestead Act); 43 U.S.C. §§
321-39 (1970) (Desert Land Act); 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970) (General Mining
Law).
125. E.g., Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountain National Parks, 16 U.S.C.
§ 403 (1970); Everglades National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410 (1970); Isle Royale National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 408 (1970). It was also a policy to eliminate private holdings in established parks. See 16 U.S.C. § 164 (1970).
126. At some parks, like Acadia and Cape Hatteras, it was thought desirable to
retain examples of traditional communities. F. DARLING & N. EICHHORN, MAN AND
NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 18-19 (1967). See also C. CAMPBELL, supra note
19, at 148-49 (Great Smoky Mountains National Park). See 16 U.S.C. § 459a1 (1970): "That the legal residents of villages •.. shall have the right to earn
a livelihood by fishing within the boundaries • . . subject to such rules and regulations as the • . . Secretary may deem necessary . . .•" At other parks, established
residents were permitted to remain on compassionate grounds, or because highly developed settlements already existed, see note 19 supra.
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the general police power. 127 In other parks, sword-of-Damocles
type laws are in effect, and the Park Service indirectly asserts the
general police power. 128 Elsewhere, there is only sporadic regulation over private lands within park boundaries. 12° For private
lands outside park boundaries, there is generally no regulation,
though the Park Service may exert indirect influence either by negotiation with local officials, by threatening to institute nuisance litigation, or, if statutory authority exists, by threatening to condemn
the land. Yet boundary lines have sometimes been drawn according
to no discernible principle (except the obvious expedient of response
to contending political forces), and thus some lands outside park
boundaries seem at least as needful of federal regulation as many
private inholdings. 130
Obviously, if it were possible to begin anew, free of political
pressures, the establishment of rational park boundary lines would
be the logical first step. In such an ideal situation, park boundaries would be established according to principles of intelligent ecological management. They would respect watershed lines, viable
wildlife habitats, natural landscape divisions such as ridge lines and
valleys, and those land contours that describe the ordinary limits of
phenomena such as erosion, stream siltation, and flooding. These
boundaries would represent an intelligible managerial principle-that
is, they would delimit areas within which comprehensive, integrated
federal management would be routinely required for the safeguarding
of park values.
Lamentably, no such ideal situation exists or is likely to develop,
although the deplorable experience with the Redwoods National
Park should suggest to Congress the true cost to the nation of manipulation of park boundary decisions based on expediency. The
practical problem, then, is to compose a coherent managerial
program, given the park boundaries as they presently exist.
The difficulties of the Park Service would be minimized if it
were allowed to regulate private lands both within and without the
parks to the fullest extent of federal constitutional authority. But
there are other important considerations, which suggest that Park
Service authority should not extend to its constitutional limits. The
prospect of federal agencies as land-use czars would be most
127.
128.
129.
130.

See
See
See
See

notes 41, 42 supra.
note 19 supra.
text at notes 16-18 supra.
note 77 supra.
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unpopular politically, however clear their constitutional authority
may be. Moreover, outside the parks there are established
communities with legitimate interests of their own; it would be
unwise summarily to displace those interests in favor of the Park
Service. Further, however irrationally drawn some park boundaries
may be, the Park Service has greater responsibilities within the parks
than it has beyond park boundary lines. Finally, Congress cannot
give the Park Service full police powers outside its boundaries without
deciding where that power should end, for the problems of troublesome private land uses may arise hundreds of miles from a park,
as demonstrated by the recent Kaiparowits controversy over a proposed power plant in Utah. 131
2. A Proposal for the Limits of Regulatory Authority

Congress can achieve an appropriate balancing of the competing
interests by giving the Park Service two different mandates for the
exercise of regulatory authority, one for private inholdings and the
other for private land beyond park boundaries. Regarding private
inholdings, it is suggested that the Park Service be given authority
to exercise the general police power to the full extent necessary to
maintain the parks for the purposes for which Congress established
them. Because it is sharply limited in physical extent, such a
mandate should not even arguably fall afoul of the decided cases on
the property and commerce powers; these decisions have shown that
the judiciary becomes uneasy only at the prospect of "an exercise
of a general control over public policy in a State. " 132
Such a policy for regulating inholdings would be desirable because
it would permit the Park Service to exercise similar powers in those
parks in which exclusive jurisdiction has been ceded and those in
which it has not. Still, the significance of a cession would not be
lost, for federal authority would only be exercised in nonceded
parks to the extent that a need is found for broad federal protective
regulation under the property and commerce clauses. In parks over
which state jurisdiction has been ceded, the federal government
would exercise the general police power for all purposes. In either
case, this approach would permit needed direct federal regulation
of inholdings at places like Fire Island and would free the Park
131. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1975, at 24, col. 1.
132. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 2292 (1976), quoting United States
v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940).
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Service from reliance on the demonstrably inadequate sword-ofDamocles approach.
As for land beyond park boundaries, no general police power regulation is likely to be necessary. In regulating these lands, the Park
Service should be limited to curbing the kinds of activities that gave
rise to the Camfield and Alford cases; this sort of conduct may be
described very broadly as nuisance-like. The term "nuisance" is
used here descriptively, rather than technically, and two qualifications must be noted to avert misunderstanding. First, Congress
should allow the Park Service by regulation to define nuisance-like
activity for itself, rather than having slavishly to follow existing state
law. 133 And, second, some accommodation must be made for the
peculiar circumstances in which government as a landowner finds
itself. 134
For example, while aesthetic nuisance is still recognized only
sporadically in American law, protection against visual intrusion is
central to the mission of the Park Service. Thus Congress ought
to grant explicit authority to control, and to prohibit, structures like
the Gettysburg Tower and the high rise hotel that has been built
on the outskirts of Great Smoky Mountains National Park but is
strikingly visible from many places within the Park. Similarly, authority should be given to control the development, on external
lands, of massive amusement parks that would bring major land
clearings, substantial structures and hordes of patrons within sight
and sound of park visitors. At the same time, it should not be necessary to prevent all commercial activity or to restrain very tightly residential growth and highway building outside the parks in the same
133. An example of the judiciary defining nuisance-like activity without regard
for a particular state's limited concepts is provided in Camfield i·. United States,
167 U.S. 518 (1897), other aspects of which were discussed in the text accompanying notes 63 and 64 supra. There, a Colorado landowner who had totally enclosed
a portion of public land by building fences on his own land claimed that neither the
common law nor Colorado law prohibited such conduct. The Court admitted this,
but noted that one state, Massachusetts, had recently legislated against spite fences.
After drawing analogies to established common-law principles and considering the
responsibilities of being a good neighbor, the Court found for the government,
thereby establishing a new sort of federal common law of nuisance. The Park
Service should be allowed to apply such diverse principles when it fashions regulations.
·
134. Such circumstances were present in Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523
(1911), where the federal government sued to bar trespassing cattle from a national
forest. The defense was that state law prohibited a trespass action unless a plaintiff
had fenced his land. The government had not fenced the forest, but the Court im•
plied that this law should not be applied against the United States because it was
unreasonable to expect the government to fence a vast tract of open forest. This
view was affirmed in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285 (1976).
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way that such restraints should be applied to private lands within
park boundaries.
3. Regulation and Litigation
If the sort of legislation proposed here is enacted, the Park Service
will have authority to issue wide-ranging regulations. Regarding
land beyond park boundaries, such legislation could broadly, but
specifically, identify conventional problems such as degradation of
the park's air and water, siltation of streams, endangerment by
winds, landslides, mudslides, erosion, land subsidence, noise,
congestion, visual obstructions and intrusions upon the experience
of park visitors, unreasonable uses of toxic substances that endanger
plants and wildlife within the park, and activity in the nature of
trespass upon park lands. The Park Service would periodically issue
regulations to meet these problems.
Is that authority enough, or should Congress also empower the
Park Service to initiate litigation and seek judicial development of
a federal common law of nuisance for the parks? There will inevitably arise unanticipated problems that are not reached by the
language or obvious intent of the regulatory statute. In addition,
there are always distinctive, individual situations that cannot be
covered by regulations of general application. It is desirable that
the Park Service have supplemental authority to go into court with
a nuisance-type claim when confronted with such unforeseen
circumstances.
While one is inherently disadvantaged in specifying problems that
cannot be anticipated, certainly it is possible to imagine a statute
similar to that suggested here, enacted in 1930, that failed to say
anything about radioactive hazards·. And it might be imagined
that industrial processes of the future will produce unreasonable intrusions not easily encompassed within contemporary notions of
noise, pollution, "toxicity, or trespass. Rather than attempting to
deal with every possible problem by enacting a statute that gives the
Secretary open-ended authority to promulgate regulations, Congress
ought to empower the Park Service to litigate whenever unanticipated
activities may endanger a park. The courts will thus have the opportunity to examine thoroughly both the alleged danger to the parks
and the social need for the activities in question.
A provision for litigation to develop federal common-law nuisance
should be advantageous both to the Park Service and to landowners.
The existence of a potential judicial remedy should help to
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discourage the Park Service from formulating vague, all-encompassing regulations designed to guard against every possible
contingency. From the landowner's perspective, a nuisance action
provides a greater opportunity to put forward the substantive merits
of a particular case, rather than being limited to the narrow arguments that a regulation exceeded the authority granted in the statute
or that it is arbitrary and capricious. 185
It is desirable that those potentially affected by publicly imposed
constraints have a significant opportunity to express their concerns.
If regulations are proposed to govern recurrent problems involving
substantial numbers of people, it is reasonable to anticipate that
sufficient numbers of the affected group will forcefully voice their
objections at the time the regulations are proposed, thereby having
some influence on the outcome. The more individualistic or vague
the regulations, the less that opportunity realistically exists. For
such circumstances, the Park Service should be authorized, and
encouraged, to institute litigation so that landowners can obtain a full
hearing. While it will not be possible for legislation to define
exactly those situations in which litigation rather than regulation is
appropriate, Congress can certainly give the Park Service guidance
through a careful development of legislative history
It would also be wise explicitly to limit the Park Service to a
judicial federal nuisance remedy for all conduct beyond a specified
distance from the park. There is little need for control by regulation, even over common nuisance-like activities, as one moves
away significantly from park boundaries. Moreover, the further one
moves from the park, the greater is the likelihood of intruding upon
the extensive land regulation of established cities and towns. A
mileage limitation would minimize the potential for conflict,
confusion, and duplicative efforts among the various governments.
It would be undesirable to require large numbers of people at some
distance from the parks to study park regulations before they could
vary the uses of their land. Beyond this, there is much to be said
for blunting the perception that the Park Service will, if permitted, seek to become an ubiquitous land manager. A sensible limitation might be to require litigation of problems arising on land more
than two or three miles from the park, or on closer lands outside
the park boundaries if the land is within a sizeable city (50,000
135. For the effect of the Administrative Procedure Act on the Park Service,
see Williams, supra note 122, at 22 n.36.
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population or more), which is likely to have its own elaborate land
use controls.
4. Choosing Between Acquisition and Regulation
There remains the question of when the federal government
ought to buy, rather than merely regulate, land whose uses
potentially conflict with park purposes. The preceding pages imply
clearly enough that present congressional and administrative policies.
go too far in the direction of acquisition, but in formulating a new
policy care must be taken to avoid excessive reliance on regulation.
Obviously, the federal government should, and must, buy interests when attempts to regulate them would be unconstitutional
takings of property. There is, however, a further consideration.
The United States is, for purposes of these cases, both the sovereign
and a neighboring landowner. Limited only by constitutional prohibitions against uncompensated takings, the federal government may
be in a position to constrain quite unfairly the uses to which its
private neighbors put their land. It ought, therefore, to adopt a
policy for fair dealing that goes beyond the bare bones of its constitutional duty to compensate.
In order to fulfill both its constitutional duties and to conform with
reasonable standards of fair dealing, the federal government should
acquire an ownership interest in private land within or near park
boundaries if one of the following conditions obtains:
a. The land is needed for occupancy by the Park Service or by
park visitors.
b. The land, though not needed for occupancy, requires the
acquisition of interests in land which, under the established
law of eminent domain, constitutes a taking of property.
c. The federal government imposes contraints which, even if not
a taking under constitutional doctrine, go beyond the sorts of
regulation that have become familiar under the general police
power in American law or in the resolution of conflicts between neighbors.
Unless the constraint falls within one of these three categories, the
Park Service should be free to regulate private land in accordance
with the approach suggested above. Each of these standards will
now be explained specifically.
a. Land needed for occupancy. A simple rule of thumb applicable to most situations that are traditionally and literally a taking
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of property is that they involve the acquisition of physical possession.
There is no significant ambiguity in this category.
b. Nonoccupancy interests that constitute a taking.
The imposition of nondevelopment easements entailing severe economic
loss to the owner, even though the desired uses do not impair the
use of the federally owned land, would generally be treated as a
taking. For example, if farming were prohibited in order to preserve the land's wild appearance, or if all structures and roads were
ordered removed from the land, acquisition with compensation
would probably be necessary. 136 A flat prohibition upon all timber
harvesting would normally fall within this category, as would a requirement that the land be managed unprofitably in order to provide
browse for wildlife indigenous to the park. 137 In general, the imposition of affirmative duties, such as the construction and maintenance of fire towers for the benefit of park lands, would also be
considered nonoccupancy takings.
c. Constraints that go beyond familiar police power or conflict
accommodation between neighbors. This third standard for acquisition is designed to impose upon the federal government a
requirement of fairness more generous than the Constitution
demands, so that the private neighbors of national parks will not be
disadvantaged merely because the federal government is their
neighbor. The principle might be stated this way: It is unreasonable for a private property owner to demand that he not be disadvantaged at all because a national park is his neighbor, but it is
reasonable for him to demand that he not be disadvantaged by restrictions outside the scope of those that have become conventional
American law for the resolution of conflicts between neighboring
landowners.
One can readily conceive of circumstances where regulation without compensation would be at least arguably constitutional, but
where considerations of fairness ought to prevail and require
payment. The Park Service should not, out of a desire to maintain
136. The exact limits of constitutional constraint under the fifth amendment are
far from clear, and it is not the purpose of this article to review those questions
in detail. The examples given are simply by way of broad illustration. For a detailed analysis of the constitutional issue, see the articles cited in note 58 supra.
For a case suggesting that even the restrictions used as illustrations in the text might
pass constitutional muster, see Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d
761 (1972).
137. It should be noted that this is, in essence, the situation in which the Supreme Court reserved judgment under the property power in Kleppe v. New Mexico,
96 S. Ct. 2285, 2295 (1976).
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the ecological purity of the park area, prohibit agricultural
landowners from using pesticides that are generally accepted on
agricultural lands elsewhere, unless it is willing to pay for the losses
that such restraints may entail. Nor should it bar private owners
from using conventional fire-fighting techniques, even in park areas
where the Service has decided upon a strategy of letting fires bum
themselves out. Despite its special concern for maintaining wildlife
populations in a park, the Park Service should not impose upon its
neighbors land management strategies for the maintenance of
wildlife that are more onerous than those applicable to open or
agricultural lands generally. 138 Of course, the Service may freely
employ all these constraints if it is willing to compensate the
landowners.
A case study that illuminates the proper application of this principle is the bitterly contested battle over automobile regulation at
Fire Island National Seashore. 139 The Seashore Superintendent has
called the controversy "perplexing . . . emotion laden, sensitive
_ . a can of worms." 140 In brief, the problem arises from the
fact that Fire Island seashore includes a number of intensively developed resort communities, as well as a fragile dune ecosystem on
a small barrier island. Traditional access to the island had been by
boat, but two automobile bridges were built, one of them in 1964,
the same year the National Seashore was established. The Park
Service established a regulation forbidding vehicular traffic across
the federal lands in the Seashore. Private housing development
mushroomed in the following decade and residents have applied
intense pressures, including litigation, in an effort to secure permission
138. Under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1334
(Supp. V 1975), private landowners are permitted, but not required, to maintain
such animals on their lands.
139. See Neilson v. Gotbolt, Mem., No. 75-C-1283 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1975);
Biderman v. Morton, 507 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1974), affg. Mem., No. 72-C-1060
(E.D.N.Y. July 19, 1974). See also Lighthouse Shores Inc. v. Town of Islip, N.Y.2d - , 372 N.Y.S.2d 995, - N.E.2d - (1976); Long Island Beach Buggy Assn.
v. Town of Islip, 58 Misc. 2d 295, 295 N.Y.S.2d 268, affd., 35 App. Div. 2d 739, 316
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1970); Hodges v. Town of Islip, N.Y.L.J. July 27, 1964 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau Co.); Faulhaber v. Village of Saltaire, Mem., June 8, 1970, Index No.
192005 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co.); Thornberg v. Town of Islip, Mem., Dec. 11, 1975,
Index No. 74-9379 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co.).
A similar controversy over the use of vehicles has arisen at Back Bay National
Wildlife Refuge, managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. See Coupland v.
Morton, 526 F.2d 588, 7 ERC 2127, 5 ELR 20507 (4th Cir. 1975); National Audubon
Socy. v. Kleppe, No. 76-589-N (E.D. Va., filed Sept. 28, 1976); Note 5 ELR 10148
(1975).
140. Letter from Richard W. Marks, Superintendent, to Congressman Thomas
J. Downey, File W46 FIIS, Feb. 25, 1976, at 1, 12.
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to drive through the National Seashore to reach private property. 141
Several courts have concluded that very strict vehicle use
constraints imposed by the Park Service142 (as well as by a local
municipality) are constitutional, within statutory authority and
reasonably appropriate to protect the Seashore lands. 148 But there
remains the painful and politically sensitive144 question whether the
rigorous restraints the Park Service imposed are unfair to the residents subject to them. Without doubt the regulation is onerous:
"The only permit which [the Park Service has] granted . . . is
a permit authorizing [a year-round resident] to drive to mainland
Long Island once each week for medical reasons. Beyond that she
can travel by automobile only upon the receipt of a specific
permission which must be obtained by specific application covering
a particular occasion as occasions arise." 145
How are we to analyze the propriety of imposing such a regulation
without compensation? Plainly this is a much more restrictive rule
than that to which homeowners are routinely subjected by local
governments. And plainly it disappointed expectations the owner
might have had in 1969 when she acquired her property. At the
same time, a person who moves to Fire Island cannot expect to
enjoy all the usual urban amenities, particularly in light of the clear
mandate of preservation and ·limited development under which the
Seashore was established in 1964.146 In these respects, the claims
of the property owner are neither clearly unreasonable nor clearly
meritorious; the case is a hard one.
Despite the apparent difficulties, an appropriate solution can be
discerned through application of traditional legal principles to the
owner's claims. She does not qualify for an easement of necessity
under conventional property notions, for while denied the most
convenient form of access, she has not been denied all access to her
property; she continues to have the use of boats and footpaths, which
have been traditional on the island. 147 Nor have her expectations
141. The background of the Fire Island controversy is set out in U.S. DEPT. OF
THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN, FIRE ISLAND
NATIONAL SEASHORE (Draft, June 1976). See also notes 10, 35, 139 supra.
142. 36 C.F.R. § 7.20 (1976).
143. See cases cited note 139 supra.
144. See note 140 supra.
145. Neilson v. Gotbolt, Mem., 75-C-1283, at 3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1975).
146. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 459e to 459e-12 (1970).
147. See 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1T 410, at 428, 439 n.34,
444 (1975). Cf. 43 U.S.C. § 959 (1970), 43 U.S.C. § 946 (1970) (authority to
limit rights-of-way over federal lands).
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developed into rights through compliance with the rules of
prescription or adverse possession that are routinely recognized
under state law. 148 Moreover, she is no more disadvantaged by the
Park Service than she might be had her neighbor been a
private landowner. Assume, for example, that a major recreational
developer had been the owner of the Fire Island land over which
vehicle access is sought. If, despite a previous owner's permission
to drive over that land, the developer had decided to build a summer
resort free of J:Qotor vehicle traffic (similar .to that on Mackinac
Island, Michigan), she would surely have been subject to the same
sort of inconvenience that the Park Service has now imposed upon her.
These factors should be decisive against the resident, for while
she has been disadvantaged by being a neighbor of the Park Service,
she has not been "disadvantaged by restrictions outside the scope
of those that have become conventional in American law in
resolving conflicts between neighboring landowners." 140 The Park
Service should be free to impose such regulations on landholders without compensation.
A final observation on this subject is that Congress need not legislate explicitly on the question of when acquisition is required.
Congress can make clear in a statute setting out Park Service regulatory authority, and in the legislative history, that the regulatory
power is not meant to include the imposition of restrictions outside
the scope of those that have been enacted by local governments or
have become conventional in the resolution of disputes between
neighboring landowners. Thus, should the Park Service attempt to
regulate beyond that scope, an affected landowner could properly
challenge the regulation as beyond the power Congress intended to
confer. If the landowner prevails, the Park Service would have no
choice but to seek funds to acquire the interest in question. Or
Congress could, in any given instance, reject the judicial interpretation of its intent by refusing to allow acquisition and by stating
explicitly its desire to permit uncompensated regulation in the particular situation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Before the general suggestions made in the preceding pages can
be converted into specific statutory language, a number of difficult
148. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 147, ,r 413, at 493 n.58, 497,
n.10, 521-23; RESTATEMENT OF PROPER1Y § 479 (1944).
149. See text following note 137 supra.
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issues must be resolved. Among them is whether a single statute
could adequately speak to the variety of managerial issues that
face the Park Service, which has charge of hundreds of seashores,
monuments, parks, and historic sites. Another is -the ever perplexing
question of the degree of specificity with which Congress should
instruct administrative officials.
It is not the purpose of this article to provide the answers to all
these, and many other, questions, which will require the knowledge
and experience of Park Service personnel. It is hoped that this
article will commend itself as the beginning of an inquiry into proposals for much needed legislation. The outcome of that inquiry
cannot be predicted with exactitude here. But certainly enough has
been said in this article to suggest that the giants can properly be
roused from their long sleep.

